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Abstract 
To answer the question of workforce diversity and efficiency, this paper departs from the 
approach used in most recent empirical papers exploiting firm-level evidence, where output is 
regressed on traditional inputs plus an index of diversity (Parrotta et al., 2012). We suggest 
addressing the question by adopting a more structural framework. The idea is to root the 
empirical strategy applied to firm-level data in the theoretical literature on population 
heterogeneity/stratification and growth (Bénabou, 1994). Essentially, what that literature 
suggests is that diversity is optimal when the technology displays concavity in the share of 
workers considered (e.g. decreasing marginal contribution of rising shares of more 
productive/skilled workers). What is also shown in this paper is that a production function à-la-
Hellerstein-Neumark — where workforce diversity is captured via an index of labour shares — 
is suitable for estimating the concavity of the technology, and thus for assessing the case 
for/against workforce diversity. Finally, the paper contains an application of this Bénabou-
Hellerstein-Neumark framework to two panels of Belgian firms covering the 1998-2012 period. 
The main result is that of an absence of strong evidence that age, gender or educational diversity 
is good or bad for efficiency.  
Keywords: efficiency, labour diversity, concavity. 
JEL Codes: J11, J14, J21  
1  Economics Department, IRES, Economics School of Louvain (ESL), Université catholique de Louvain 
(UCL), 3 place Montesquieu, B-1348 Belgium email : vincent.vandenberghe@uclouvain.be. 
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1. Introduction 
The popular press usually discusses workforce diversity as being beneﬁcial for efficiency.  How 
do economists address this topical question? 
A first stream of the economic literature adopts a rather micro and within-firm perspective. It 
has its roots in personnel economics and human resources management theory. Some authors 
active in that field argue that diversity can create negative eﬀects due to poor communication, 
lower social ties and trust, and also poor cooperation among workers (Becker, 1957; Lazear, 
1998, 1999). Others posit that diversity can be beneﬁcial to ﬁrm performance due to better 
decision making, improved problem solving, enhanced creativity, or a better ability to interact 
with clients that are themselves very diverse (Hong and Scott 2001, 2004; Glaeser et. al. 2000). 
Empirically, economists try to assess which of these two antagonist forces prevail by examining 
how (within firm) workforce diversity translates into firm-level efficiency gains/losses. The 
most recent contributions exploit the potential of firm-level longitudinal (i.e. panel) data to 
explore how within firm changes or the degree of diversity of the workforce affect output. 
Recent examples are Kurtulus (2011), Ilmakunnas & Ilmakunnas, (2011), Garnero et al., (2014) 
or Parrotta et al. (2012).  Compared to studies based on cross-sectional material, these provide 
evidence and results that are much more robust and trustworthy. Findings generally show that 
educational diversity is beneficial for firm productivity. In contrast, age and gender (i.e. 
demographic) diversity are found to hamper firm-level added value per worker ceteris paribus. 
We would argue that one of weaknesses of the above empirical papers resides in the rather ad 
hoc speciﬁcation of the underlying technology. The authors basically regress productivity2 on 
labour, capital3 and descriptive indicators of labour diversity (i.e. standard deviation, 
dissimilarity or Herfindhal/Simpson indices). The reduced-form equations that are estimated 
do not explicitly derive from the standard textbook production functions (Cobb-Douglas, 
CES…). What is more, they do no connect with another stream of the economic literature 
assessing the benefits/losses of diversity. That literature is more structural. It has developed 
concepts like super[sub]modularity of production (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Iranzo et al., 
2  Generally the log of value added per worker. 
3  And not all of them have information on capital stock. 
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2008) 4, the O-ring theory (Kremer, 1993), that of assortative matching (Becker, 1981; Durlauf 
& Seshadriand, 2003), or examined the relationship between local stratification and growth 
(Bénabou, 1993; 1996a,b). Also, it takes a more macro stance. Diversity/homogeneity is 
discussed in terms of its impact on aggregate output (i.e. that of the different 
neighbourhoods/regions forming a city/country….), and results carry very specific implications 
in terms of how diverse/heterogeneous individuals5 should be allocated across entities.6  This 
said, we would argue here that both literatures ultimately address the same key question, which 
is to determining — using Grossman & Maggi (2000) terminology — whether crossmatching 
(all entities comprise a diversified set of individuals) is preferable than selfmatching (type of 
individuals is concentrated in one distinct entity). 
In this paper, we suggest exploring the diversity/efficiency nexus, in the context of private-
economy firms, using a branch of that second literature; more specifically, the framework of 
authors who have studied stratification/diversity and growth in the context of cities (Bénabou, 
1993) and/or educational systems (Vandenberghe, 1999). Referring to the discussion above, 
that literature presents the advantage that it has developed a structural and encompassing view 
on efficiency, and it deals explicitly with the issue of optimal allocation of diverse individuals.  
What it essentially shows is that crossmatching (i.e. diversity) is effective when the ‘local’ 
technology (i.e. the one characterising neighbourhoods, schools or firms) displays concavity; 
in other words, decreasing marginal contribution to total output of rising shares of individuals 
of the most productive type (e.g. highly educated)).  
The second methodological contribution of this paper is it show that a slightly “augmented” 
version of the Hellestein-Neumark framework (Hellerstein & Neumark, 1995) [HN hereafter] 
4  The latter narrowly corresponds to what is commonly considered as the cost/benefit of input diversity 
(Grossman & Maggi, 2000). Super[sub] modularity carry very specific implications for the optimal organization 
of production. If a technology is supermodular, efficiency requires self-matching. An example is the O-ring 
technology imagined by Kremer (1993), where output critically depends each individual’s correct execution of 
his/her task. In that case, workers should be sorted so that those with similar skills work together. In contrast, when 
a technology is submodular, crossmatching (diversity) is indicated. 
5  Mainly in terms of their skills. 
6  The results of the more empirical and firm-centric litterature implicitly carry similar implications about 
optimal allocation. If for instance a representative firm is less effective when age heteorogeneity (as captured by 
the standard deviation of age) rises, the inevitable implication is that maximising overall productivity requires age 
selfmatching.  
3 
 
                                                 
can be used to assess the degree concavity/convexity in the share of a particular type of worker. 
The key idea of HN is to estimate a production function where heterogeneous/diverse labour 
input appear as a sum of shares, and where different worker types (e.g. educated/uneducated; 
men/women, young/old…) potentially differ in terms of marginal product.  Most authors have 
used the HN framework to measure productivity/skills difference across different types of 
workers; with the aim of comparing them to wage differences (and assess the degree of 
alignment of wage and productivity/skills). Our objective here is rather to show that an HN 
framework, that allows for imperfect substitutability across labour types, is suitable to address 
the question of concavity/convexity in the share of types of workers, and thus that of the 
relationship between diversity and efficiency.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes our analytical framework in 
details. Section 3 presents our data as well as the econometric strategy. Section 4 contains the 
results of its application to the analysis of Belgian firm-level data where workers differ in terms 
of educational attainment, age and gender. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Framework 
i) Concavity/convexity and overall efficiency 
Imagine an economy that consists of i=1…N firms, each of them potentially employing two 
(unequally productive) types of workers. The economy-wide output is the sum of output of the 
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N firms.  The proportion of (high/low) productive workers in firm i is xi ;while the 
corresponding proportion of the same type of workers in firm N is xN  
[1.] W=Y(x1) +Y(x2)+ ….+ Y(xN) 
Starting from a situation synonymous with crossmatching x1=x2=…=xN=θ — where θ is the 
share of the workers of the type considered in the whole population — consider the effect of 
raising their share in firm 1, at the expense of, say, firm N.  
[2.] δW/δx1= δY(.)/δx1 + δYN(.)/δxN [δxN/δx1] 
By assumption the rise of the type’s share in firm 1 translates (leaving aside the question of size 
differences across firms) into a reduction of their share in firm N. Logically thus [δxN/δx1]=-1 
[3.] δW/δx1= δY(.)/δx1 - δY(.)/δxN  
In x1=xN=θ the two derivatives are equal, and expression [3] is equal to 0, meaning that that 
point corresponds to an extremum.  Whether it defines a maximum or a minimum depends on 
the second-order condition  
[4.] δ2W/δx1 δx1 = δ2Y1(.)/δx1 δx1 – δ2YN(.)/δxN δxN.[δxN/δx1] 
Or equivalently as, again, [δxN/δx1]=-1 
[5.] δ2W/δx1 δx1 = δ2Y1(.)/δxiδx1 + δ2YN(.)/δxN δxN 
Thus if δ2Y(.)/δxi δxi >0 (ie. the firm-level technology is convex in share of high productive) 
optimality requires adopting corner solutions (i.e. selfmatching/minimal diversity). By contrast, 
if δ2Y(.)/δxi δxi<0 (the firm-level technology is concave), the optimum is interior and symmetric 
(x1=xN=θ). Maximizing ouput requires crossmatching/maximal diversity.  
Figure 1 illustrates the idea of concavity in x (i.e. the share of high(low) productive workers) 
being good for efficiency. Of course, Figure 1a shows that a higher share of the high productive 
type (say in firm a) translates into a higher firm-level output. But, if we assume that such a 
move translates into a reduction of the equivalent share elsewhere in the economy (say in 
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firm b), the question of the net impact amounts to verifying that output in c is higher than the a 
and b average.  The point to bear in mind is that intra-firm diversity is higher if the economy 
consists of firms in c rather than a or b.  
Figure 1 – Concavity of production technology in a given worker type and overall efficiency 
 
a. High productive type 
 
b. Low productive type 
 
Finally for this section, we would like to talk about the apparent contrast beween the framework 
of this paper and the one underpinning most existing works by empirical economists on 
diversity.  This paper focuses on workforce diversity and its impact on aggregate efficiency, 
while the latter works generally care about firm-level efficiency.  Our view is that there is 
fundamentally no opposition between what matters for a representative firm (and its managers) 
and what holds for the whole economy. 
Assume for a moment that we exclusively consider the point of view of the firm and its 
managers. They decide to increase the proportion of presumably more productive workers7 (x 
goes up in Figure 2). That move (say from a to c) has two consequences. First, it mechanically 
(i.e. linearly) increases the average of the individual productivities characterizing the workers. 
The second consequence is that the firm becomes more diverse.  In order to determine whether 
7 The reasoning is the same with a move that is synonymous of a rising share of the less productive type. 
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diversity matters, managers need to determine whether output Y is affected beyond what 
mechanically derives from the change of the average of individual productivities. In the 
Figure 2, that mechanical/linear effect corresponds to segment [C1]; and what comes on top to 
the segment [C2] to the contribution of diversity.8 That decomposition can be done using a 
traditional HN log-linear model — where the labour shares appear as a simple sum — to which 
one adds an Herfindahl index.9 The HN (productivity weighted) sum of labour shares will 
capture the mechanical/linear output consequence of a higher x (in other words [C1]), and the 
coefficient of the Herfindahl index will reflect [C2]. What we propose in this paper is to detect 
[C2] simply by allowing for non-linearties in the labour-quality index, in other words by 
replacing the traditional HN linear expression by a CES index [xρ+λ(1-x)ρ]1/ρ where r≠1 informs 
the managers (or the social planner) that diversity matters for efficiency. 
Figure 2 – Concavity and the point of view of the firm’s managers 
 
8  We could have consider a case where [C2] is negative. The important thing is to detect any deviation 
form the dashed line. 
9  When the information about firms’ workforce takes the form of a vector of shares, economists generally 
resort to the Herfindahl/Simpson index to quantify diversity at firm level (Hi) and assess its impact on output. The 
index writes Hi= 1- ∑ (𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 ij)2 and in the case of n=2 types Hi= 1- xi2 -(1-xi)2 
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ii) Concavity and the Hellerstein-Neumark framework  
The next step is to specify a realistic (and econometrically tractable) firm-level production 
function that is function of xi. The one we retain here owes a lot to Hellerstein & Neumark 
(1995), but also to the literature on productivity and skill diversity (Duffy et al., 2004; Iranzo 
et al. 2008), or the one studying the relationship between age and productivity (Vandenberghe 
et al., 2013).10 In these works, the production function of a representative firm (from now on, 
for simplicity of exposure, we drop index i) writes as a standard Cobb-Douglas 
[6.] Y=A Kα QLβ   
where Y is output (or productivity), K is the stock of capital. The key variable is what is called 
the quality of labour aggregate QL. Total labour is L. But what matters is its decomposition 
into different types. Without loss of generality, we consider a situation with two types (h,l) 
where Lh is the number of (presumably) high productive workers in the firm.  Parameters µh, 
represents the types’ contribution to output (or actual skills).11 
[7.] QL=[µh(Lh)r+µl(L-Ll)r]1/r 
We suggest specifying the quality aggregate as a CES index, where labour types are not 
perfectly substituable and contribute to output non-linearly. The latter assumption is essential 
for assessing concavity/convexity of the technology in a worker’s type, and answering the 
question of the desirablity of diversity in terms of overall efficiency. By contrast, HN assume 
perfect substitutability (r=1) meaning the CES collapses to a simple sum, and also, (as will 
become clearer after) that diversity does not matter for the economy’s efficiency, as the firm-
level technology is neither convave nor convex in a worker’s type. 
Expression [9] can be easily be rewritten in terms of labour shares, with x≡ Lh/L the proportion 
10  Which is relatively more developed than the literature on age diversity, and better connected to the 
standard economic theory of production. It has inherited form the methodology used by the numerous economists 
interested in assessing the degree of complementary between skills (educated labour) and capital. 
11  Note that here, contrary to Iranzo et al. (2008), workers’ skills are not available or measured ex ante. 
But estimates of the relative productivity (i.e. skills) by type can be estimated econometrically.  
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of workers with productivity µh. By definition, in a two-types setting, (1-x) is the share of the 
other type of workers present in the firm.  
[8.] QL = L [µhxr +µl(1-x)r] 1/r   
or equivalently, picking type h workers as reference category 
[9.] QL =L µh1/r [xr+λ(1-x)r]1/ρ 
with λ≡µl/µh the relative marginal productivity of type l workers  
The point is that expression [11] now appears as function of the share of type h workers x. This 
means that the key question raised in this paper (i.e. is diversity good/bad for efficiency), 
amounts to determining whether QL is concave or convex in x.  
Back to the full production function, one needs to inject [11] into [8]  
[10.] Y=  ?̃?𝐴 Kα L β [xr+λ(1-x)r]β/r 
where ?̃?𝐴= A µhβr 
Noting f(x)≡[xr+λ(1x)r]1/ρ the part of the labour quality aggregate that consists of a CES index, 
the firm-level output’s  second-order derivative with respect to x is 
[11.] 𝜕𝜕
2𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
=  Aµhβ/ρKαLβ βf(x)β-1[(β-1)(𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
2
/f(x) + 𝜕𝜕
2𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
] 
where 
[12.]  𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
=[xr+λ(1-x)r]1/r-1(xr-1-λ(1-x)r-1)= [xr+λ(1-x)r]1/r-1 xr-1(1-λ(1−𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
)r-1) 
and, most importantly, the 2nd order derivative of the CES index is 
[13.] 𝜕𝜕
2𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
=(r-1)[xr+λ(1-x)r]1/r-2λ(1-x)r-2xr-2 
The sign of [13] is entirely determined by those of parameters β and r.  The first parameter is 
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nothing but the output elasticity with respect to total labour of the Cobb-Douglas part of the 
prodution function. And, presumably, in the presence of capital, it is inferior to 1. This means 
a diminishing marginal productivity for total labour (L).12And, by extension, that law also 
applies to any quality-adjusted labour aggregate à-la HN. Assuming that labour types’ marginal 
productivity differ significantly (ie. in expression [14] λ(1−𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
)r-1≠1 or just that λ≠1 in case of 
perfect substitutablity (r=1)), then changes in the value of x amounts to changing the overall 
level of (quality-ajusted) labour. That logically translates into a fall of marginal productivity, 
tha is captured in expression [13] by the term premultiplied by β-1.  
The more interesting question is what happens with parameter r conditional on a certain value 
of β ; or said differently to determine whether the law of diminishing marginal productivity is 
positively (or negatively) affected by the diversity of the labour force.  And that amounts to 
determining if r≠1.  If r<1 we would conclude that diversity is good for efficiency ceteris 
paribus. If r>1 then diversity is a bad thing for efficiency. And if r=1 diversity becomes 
irrelevant.  
3. Econometric analysis 
i) Data 
The results of this paper derive from the analysis of two panels. The first one contains around 
8,000+ firms with more than 20 employees. These firms are largely representative of the 
Belgian private economy in terms of sector/industry, and are well documented as to the capital 
they used and, their productivity performance.13 Using firm identifiers, we have been able to 
add social security information14 on the age and gender of (all) workers employed by these 
firms, and this for a period running from 1998 to 2006. Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics.  Of particular importance are the ones describing age and gender.  Note in that age 
12  With the standard Cobb-Douglas Y=A Kα QLβ one has that 
𝜕𝜕2𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
=  A Kαβ(β-1) Lβ-2<0 if β<1 
13  These observations come from the Bel-first database. Most for-profit firms located in Belgium must 
feed that data base to comply with legal prescriptions. 
14  Compiled in the so-called Carrefour database. 
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and gender diversity (as captured by the Herfindahl index) seems to have risen between 1998 
and 2006. 
The second panel contains information about the educational attainment of the workforce. It 
comprises a slightly smaller number of firms (4000+); also from all sectors forming the Belgian 
private economy. It runs from 2008 to 2012. Firms are also well documented in terms of sector, 
overall size of the labour force, capital used, and productivity (value added). But there is no 
information on the age and gender of the workforce that would allow a more refined breakdown 
of educational categories. 
Descriptive statistics, are reported in Table 2. Of prime interest in this paper is the breakdown 
by educational attainment. Table 2 shows that, during the observed period (2008–2012), more 
than 75% of the workforce of private for-profit firms located in Belgium have, at most, an upper 
secondary school degree. This means less than 25% of workers in possessing of a tertiary 
education background; clearly less than the percentage among the current generation of school 
leavers.15 This discrepancy logically reflects the lower propensity of older generations to stay 
on beyond secondary education, and complete a tertiary. But given the focus of this paper, 
perhaps the most important point worth observing is that educational diversity inside firms 
located in Belgium (as reflected by the Herfindahl index reported in the last column) has 
seemingly increased a bit between 2008 and 2012.   
Table1- Descriptive statistics. Age, Gender. Main variables (weighted (£))/1998-2006 
        
 Value 
added[log] 
k EUR 
N. of 
empl.[log] 
Capital[log] Share 
50+ 
Herf age Share 
female 
Herf 
gender 
1998 10.072 6.146 8.111 0.132 0.213 0.249 0.277 
1999 10.095 6.088 8.146 0.136 0.217 0.256 0.284 
2000 10.140 6.056 8.198 0.139 0.223 0.262 0.289 
2001 10.122 6.148 8.130 0.143 0.226 0.271 0.298 
2002 10.353 6.356 8.428 0.154 0.240 0.280 0.306 
2003 10.356 6.268 8.503 0.167 0.256 0.281 0.306 
2004 10.424 6.270 8.522 0.174 0.264 0.284 0.308 
2005 10.435 6.280 8.486 0.179 0.269 0.289 0.310 
2006 10.510 6.263 8.665 0.188 0.278 0.294 0.314 
N 75393       
£:Weights are equal to the firm’s number of workers Source: Belfirst-Carrefour 
15  Statistics Belgium estimates that they now represent between 35 and 40% of a cohort. 
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Table2 - Descriptive statistics. Education. Main variables (weighted(£))/2008-2012 
       
 Value added 
[log] 
N. of 
empl.[log] 
Capital[log] secondary or 
less 
more than 
secon. 
Herf. educ 
2008 9.515 5.313 10.248 0.784 0.215 0.181 
2009 9.262 5.080 10.035 0.761 0.239 0.200 
2010 9.340 5.133 10.095 0.762 0.238 0.199 
2011 9.373 5.170 10.111 0.755 0.245 0.199 
2012 9.391 5.171 10.119 0.751 0.249 0.203 
N 227838      
£:Weights are equal to the firm’s number of workers Source: Belfirst-Carrefour 
 
 
ii) Identification strategy 
 
The econometric version of our model, that we apply to a panel of firm writes 
[14.] Yit=Ai0 Kitα (QLit)β eτ.t + ωit 
And its log equivalent is  
[15.] ln Yit= Bi0 + αln(Kit)+ βln(Lit) + βln f(xit)+ τ.t + ωit 
with Bi0≡ln(Ai0) + β/ρln(µh),  f(xit)=(xitρ + λ(1-xit)ρ)1/ρ the  CES index as a function of labour 
shares (2 -types case), and τ the constant rate of TFP growth, common to all firms.  
We assume a three-component error term. 
[16.] ωit= ϴi + γit + δit 
meaning that the linear (or non linear) least squares sample-error term potentially consists of i) 
an unobservable firm fixed effect ϴi; ii) a short-term shock γit  (whose evolution may correspond 
to a first-order Markov chain, causing a simultaneity bias), and is observed by the firm (but not 
by the econometrician) and (partially) anticipated by the firm, and, iii) a purely random shock 
δit.  
The panel structure of our data allows for the estimation of models that eliminate the fixed 
effects (ϴi). For instance, resorting to the growth-equivalent of [14] (i.e. lag T differences of 
logs, or log of ratio of Yit to its lagged T values) leads to 
[17.] ln (Yit/Yit-T) = τT + αln(Kit/Kit-T)+  βln(Lit/Lit-T) + β/ρln(f(xit)/f(xit-T))  +  ωit- ωit-T 
12 
 
where ωit- ωit-T = γit - γiT + δit- δit-T  
This said, another challenge is to go around the simultaneity bias caused by short-term shock 
γit. Equation [17] suggests estimating a model where the dependent variable is the (estimated) 
TFP, following a two-step strategy.16 The first stept consists of estimating the log of TFP as the 
residual of the regression of output on capital and total labour: 
[18.] 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ( 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤−𝑇𝑇
)� = ln (Yit/Yit-T) - 𝛼𝛼�ln(Kit/Kit-T)-  ?̂?𝛽ln(Lit/Lit-T)  
It is when estimating that first-step equation, that we control for the presence of γit using the 
strategy developed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) (LP henceforth) and, more recently by 
Ackerberg, Caves & Fraser (2006) (ACF henceforth).  Both LP and ACF estimations involve 
assumptions about the time of the choice of inputs. Capital is assumed quasi-fixed (in the short- 
to medium run), whereas labour is more flexible and partially chosen after the (unilaterally) 
observed productivity chock γit. This makes least square estimates for labour inputs 
endogeneous. To go around this problem, LP assumes that γit can be proxied by a 3rd order 
polynom in the use of intermediate inputs (i.e. purchases of raw materials, services, 
electricity…) and also in capital.17 The sole presence of this proxy/polynom at step 1 makes it 
possible to consistently estimate β using OLS or non-linear least squares (NLLSQ). By 
extension, the residuals of that first-stage LP-ACF equation, are also clear of γit and can be used 
at stage two to consistently estimate λ and r (ie. the parameters of the CES index f(xit)) using 
NLLSQ. 
[19.] 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤/ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤-𝑇𝑇)�  = τT + β/ρln(fit(xit)/fit-T(xit-T)) + δit - δit-T 
16  Not to be confounded with the two-step estimation characterizing the method of Levinsohn & Petrin 
(2003)or Ackerberg, Caves & Fraser (2006) to estimate the parameters of a production function. 
17  The actual assumption made by LP is that the use of intermediates inputs is a monotonic function of  of 
γit and kit that can be inverted. And the inverse function can be approximated by a third-order polynom in 
intermediates and capital. 
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iii) Econometric results 
We report the key results of our analysis in Tables 3 (age), 4 (gender) and 5(education).  In each 
of them we report the results for the level [1] and the growth specification [2],[3],[4]. The 
advantage of the growth specification is that it accounts for firm-level fixed effects, known for 
being very important (Svyerson, 2011). Among our growth specification, we distinguish one-
stage [2] and two-stage models [3][4]. The first stage of the latter implement the LP [3] or the 
ACF[4] strategy to control for endogeneity/simultaneity and deliver unbiased estimates of (total 
factor) productivity which can then (in the second stage) be regressed on labour shares. 
Alongside each of these 4 specifications we also report the results obtained with the traditional 
model used by empirical economists that consists of regressing output on total capital and 
labour, the HN sum of shares for the different types of labour (bar the reference one)18  plus the 
firm-level Herfindahl index capturing workforce diversity.  
A first result is that we find evidence of (marginal) productivity differences across all the 
estimated models (i.e. λ(1−𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
)r-1≠1). Younger workers appear more productive than older 
workers, educated workers more than less educated ones, and in all cases except one (Table 5, 
model [4]), men are more productive than women.  
Second, as to the degree of concavity/convexity of the production function, our main result is 
that of an absence of strong evidence that age, gender or educational diversity is good or bad 
for efficiency. Tables 3 (age) and 4 (gender), the probability that r<1 (i.e. concavity/diversity 
being good for efficiency) seems reasonably high when estimating models [1][2], but no longer 
when turning to the models that account for endogeneity/simultaneity [3][4], in particular ACF 
where for both age and gender r’s appear very close to 1.  This is also what we find for 
education, but this time for all the econometric models estimated.  
Third, our results match up with those delivered by using the traditional HN + Herfindahl index 
approach. In Table 3 (age) and in Table 4 (gender), the coefficient of the Herfindhal index in 
models [1] [2] — akin parameter r — hints at diversity-related efficiency gains. But these gains 
18 Meaning here, given our 2-types setting, that the equation only contains one share. 
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invariably vanish in the models [3][4] that account for endogeneity/simultaneity.  As to 
education (Table 5), we also conclude that the coefficient of the Herfindahl index, like 
parameter r, and whatever the model used [1][2][3][4], points at an absence of any significant 
impact of diversity on efficiency.  
Table 3- Age diversity 
 Level Growth specification (FE) 
 [1] CES [1’] HN-
Herf 
[2] CES [2’] HN-
Herf 
[3] CES 
LP 
[3’] HN-
Herf LP 
[4] CES 
ACF 
[4’] HN-
Herf ACF 
α [K] 0.0856*** 0.0853*** 0.0237*** 0.0237***     
 (0.00117) (0.004) (0.00271) (0.003)     
β [L] 0.923*** 0.921*** 0.651*** 0.651***     
 (0.00227) (0.007) (0.00477) (0.005)     
r 0.594***  0.855***  0.960***  1.095***  
 (0.0405)  (0.0804)  (0.0947)  (0.232)  
λ 1.450***  1.478***  1.225***  1.233***  
 (0.0844)  (0.102)  (0.0866)  (0.168)  
η [1-x]  0.627***  0.333***  0.194***  0.270** 
  (0.140)  (0.054)  (0.0543)  (0.0950) 
δ [Herf]  0.567***  0.149***  0.0612  0.0818 
  (0.113)  (0.044)  (0.0446)  (0.0821) 
Controls  Share part-time work, share blue-collar workers 
Nobs 73,738 73,738 63,792 63,792 63,792 63,792 21,671 21,671 
λ 1.450  1.478  1.225  1.233  
Pr(λ=1) 0.000  0.000  0.009  0.166  
RMP$ 1.176 1.680 1.368 1.512 1.198 1.248 1.297 1.353 
Pr(RMP=1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
r 0.594***  0.855  0.960  1.095  
Pr(r =1) 0.000  0.072  0.670  0.683  
$: Implied relative marginal productivity (ref:workers aged 50+) = λ(1−𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
)
r-1
 or λ = η/β + 1 in the case of the HN-Herfindhal 
model.   Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4- Gender diversity 
 Level Growth specification (FE) 
 [1] CES [1’] HN-
Herf 
[2] CES [2’] HN-
Herf 
[3] CES 
LP 
[3’] NH-
Herf LP 
[4] CES 
ACF 
[4’] HN-
Herf ACF 
α [K] 0.0825*** 0.0806*** 0.0235*** 0.0235***     
 (0.00116) (0.00403) (0.00271) (0.00271)     
β [L] 0.924*** 0.922*** 0.652*** 0.652***     
 (0.00225) (0.00738) (0.00478) (0.00478)     
r 0.644***  0.840***  0.966***  1.050***  
 (0.0104)  (0.0401)  (0.0487)  (0.168)  
λ 1.529***  1.245***  1.147***  0.959***  
 (0.0153)  (0.0426)  (0.0372)  (0.0974)  
η [1-x]  0.462***  0.151***  0.112***  -0.00218 
  (0.0292)  (0.0257)  (0.0258)  (0.0599) 
δ [Herf]  0.526***  0.0982***  0.0363  -0.0300 
  (0.0385)  (0.0272)  (0.0273)  (0.0617) 
Controls  Share part-time work,  share blue-collar workers  
Nobs 73,736 73,736 63,788 63,788 63,788 63,788 21,671 21,671 
λ 1.529  1.245  1.147  0.959  
Pr(λ=1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.675  
RMP$ 1.758 1.501 1.304 1.232 1.156 1.144 0.951 0.997 
Pr(RMP=1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
r 0.644***  0.840***  0.966  1.050  
Pr(r =1) 0.000  0.000  0.483  0.765  
$: Implied relative marginal productivity (ref: male workers) = λ(1−𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
)
r-1
 or λ = η/β + 1 in the case of the HN-Herfindhal model 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5 - Educational diversity 
 Level Growth specification (FE) 
 [1] CES [1’] HN-
Herf 
[2] CES [2’] Herf [3] CES 
LP 
[3’] Herf 
LP 
[4] CES 
ACF 
[4’] Herf 
ACF 
α [K] 0.310*** 0.310*** 0.265*** 0.265***     
 (0.000832) (0.00279) (0.00292) (0.00292)     
β [L] 0.712*** 0.711*** 0.559*** 0.559***     
 (0.00120) (0.00310) (0.00316) (0.00316)     
r 0.996***  0.968***  0.999***  0.942***  
 (0.00862)  (0.0153)  (0.0151)  (0.0485)  
λ 1.386***  1.009***  1.012***  1.051***  
 (0.00933)  (0.00855)  (0.00800)  (0.0277)  
η [1-x]  0.224***  0.00491  0.00732  0.0466* 
  (0.00802)  (0.00496)  (0.00500)  (0.0220) 
δ [Herf]  0.0571***  0.0143  0.00260  0.0286 
  (0.0120)  (0.00817)  (0.00822)  (0.0374) 
Controls  Share females, share blue-collar workers 
Nobs 227,564 227,564 172,816 172,816 172,816 172,816 7,536 7,536 
λ 1.386  1.009  1.012  1.051  
Pr(λ=1) 0.000  0.288  0.130  0.0658  
RMP$ 1.395 1.315 1.057 1.009 1.014 1.012 1.145 1.060 
Pr(RMP=1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
β 0.712  0.559  0.624  0.778  
Pr(β =1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
r 0.996  0.968*  0.999  0.942  
Pr(r =1) 0.616  0.036  0.943  0.236  
$: Implied relative marginal productivity (ref: workers with an upper secondary degree or less) = λ(1−𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
)
r-1
 or λ = η/β + 1 in the 
case of the HN-Herfindhal model. Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first; Carrefour 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
5. Final comments 
The key message of the paper is looking at the degree of concavity/convexity of the production 
function is useful to assess the efficiency costs/benefits of labour diversity. The inspiration 
comes from the economic literature on (social) heterogeneity, stratification and growth 
(Bénabou, 1993, 1996a,b; Vandenberghe, 1999). By focusing on concavity, this paper departs 
from the approach used by most recent empirical economics papers that consists of regressing 
output on descriptive indices of workforce diversity. We think that our approach is more 
structural. It explicitly addresses the question underpinning most the empirical works done by 
economists about workforce diversity and efficiency; namely whether crossmatching (all 
entities have a diversified set of individuals) is more/less effective than selfmatching (one type 
prevails in each entity). And although it takes a more macro stance, the key issue remains the 
one that matters for firm-level efficiency.   
We show mathematically that if the technology used by individual firms is concave in the share 
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of a given worker’s type (e.g. old, female or educated), crossmatching/diversity of the types is 
synonymous with efficiency.  We then show that a generalised version of Hellerstein-Neumark 
labour-quality index — that has been extensively used by empirical economists to analyse 
productivity-related issues — is suitable to assess the degree of concavity of the technology. 
What HN have shown is that labour heterogeneity/diversity can be represented, within a Cobb-
Douglas function, as a sum of labour shares. To all those interested in analysing the diversity-
efficiency nexus, we simply propose to aggregate these shares non-linearly as a CES index.  
In the second part of the paper, we implement our innovate framework using two panels of 
firms located in Belgium for which we have information on age/gender (panel 1) and 
educational attainment (panel 2).  We apply various treatments that are aimed at controlling for 
the two main (potential) sources of bias: firm unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. We 
address the first problem by resorting to a growth/fixed-effect specification of our HN-with-
CES-index production function. And we cope with simultaneity by implementing both the 
Levinsohn & Petrin and the Ackerberg, Caves & Fraser (2006) idea of using observed 
intermediate input decisions (i.e. purchases of raw materials, services, electricity…) to control 
for/proxy unobserved short-term productivity shocks causing simultaneity.   
The main results of the paper is an absence of strong and systematic evidence that age or gender 
or educational diversity is good/bad for efficiency.  
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